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THE BODY SPEAKS ITALIAN: 
GIUSEPPE LICETI AND THE CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE  
IN THE RENAISSANCE 
 
I. Introduction: Giuseppe Liceti, Philosopher-Physician 
 
Giuseppe Liceti’s De la nobiltà de principali membri dell’huomo stages a compelling 
and learned debate among the four main bodily organs, as each of them seeks to 
demonstrate its supremacy: the brain as the organ of thinking, the heart as the centre of 
life, the liver as the origin of passions and desires, and the testicles as the organ of 
generation. The debate is not presented as a systematic discussion, but rather as a 
fictive disputation among the author’s own organs while he is asleep. Liceti claims 
that they disputed so violently that they woke him up, allowing him to listen to their 
arguments. Finding the whole dispute amusing, he decided to write it down, despite 
feeling battered and bruised: in order to have a discussion, he writes, the organs had to 
wander around the body to meet and listen to each other.1  
Liceti recalls that the work started as a disordered bundle of pages (‘fogliacci’). 
Nevertheless the booklet was published in Bologna in 1590, allegedly thanks to the 
intervention of a friend, Andrea Ceva, who subsequently features as a main 
interlocutor in Liceti’s second vernacular dialogue, entitled Il Ceva, overo 
dell’eccellenza et uso de’ genitali. These are Giuseppe Liceti’s only publications: he 
died in 1599, a year after the publication of Il Ceva. 
Despite being presented as philosopher-physician (‘medico filosofo’) on the 
frontispiece of La nobiltà, Giuseppe Liceti is only ever mentioned, if at all, in histories 
of medicine;2  his contribution to philosophy is almost entirely forgotten. Michele 
Giustiniani’s account of writers from Liguria (1647) records that Liceti, although a 
native of Genoa, had studied both philosophy and medicine in Bologna, and that he 
received his degree there in 1589. 3  On the frontispiece of his second dialogue, 
concerned with physiological and medical questions related to generation, Liceti is 
simply described as a ‘physician and surgeon from Genoa’ (‘medico chirurgo 
Genovese’).  
Liceti is known today almost exclusively as the father of his famous son, Fortunio 
(1577-1657), whom he is said to have saved from an untimely death by building the 
very first incubator, when the baby was born two months prematurely because his 
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mother was terrified when travelling by sea during a storm.4 Fortunio became well 
known for his lengthy Latin treatises – Bonaventura Cavalieri mocked him in a letter 
to Galilei, stating that he wrote “a book a week”.5 Fortunio himself played an active 
part in the reception of his father’s works.6 In De ortu animae humanae, published 
when he was only twenty-five (1602), Fortunio claims that his father’s book on the 
genitals was the starting point for his own investigation of the subject.7 But nothing 
could be more different from Giuseppe’s short vernacular dialogue than Fortunio’s 
enormous Latin treatise on the transmission of the vegetative and sensitive soul 
through the sperm. 
The aim of this article is to highlight the importance of Giuseppe Liceti’s dialogues 
as an exemplary case of the Renaissance engagement with the conflict between 
medicine and philosophy. My analysis seeks to demonstrate that Liceti was neither an 
obscure author of advice manuals, nor a satirist merely writing “light pornography” 
with a misogynistic touch.8 On the contrary, drawing attention to his dialogues will 
contribute to the ongoing reappraisal of Renaissance vernacular philosophy, 9  by 
showing how stylistic and terminological innovation were used to respond to the 
interpretative challenges faced by a Renaissance “philosopher physician”. In 
particular, I argue that Liceti employs the vernacular as a stylistic form in order to gain 
a certain degree of ironic detachment from the various sources he interweaves, 
challenges and compares in the text, most prominently Aristotle and Galen. While the 
topic he discusses is serious (“grave”), his style is consciously playful (“giocoso”).10 
In content, language and style, Liceti masters different levels, developing an approach 
that turns the dialogues into complex hybrids, at the intersection of medical expertise 
and philosophical speculation. This is especially the case in the dialogue that has been 
most neglected by scholarship, La nobiltà. The polyphonic body of La nobiltà 
becomes the battlefield where ancient and modern theories meet and are critically 
assessed: Liceti pits contemporary anatomical findings against the legacy of ancient 
medicine, puts philosophical theories to the test of direct experience, and ultimately 
uses the conflict of medicine and philosophy to show that a new anatomy prompts new 
philosophical interpretations of the nobility not only of the human body, but also of 
the human being as a whole.11  
I first examine the background of Liceti’s linguistic and stylistic choices, 
considering the position of his two dialogues in the literary and medical tradition of 
discussing the nobility of the bodily organs. I then address two main theoretical points. 
3 
The first concerns the question of how to combine the methods and results of medicine 
and philosophy: Liceti’s work poses the fundamental question of whether a (Galenic) 
physician can be an Aristotelian, and conversely what kind of medical evidence is 
required by Aristotelian philosophy.12 The second aspect relates to the implications of 
progress in the study of medicine and anatomy for the particular issue of identifying 
the seat and role of rationality in the human body. I argue that Liceti employs the 
debate of the organs to delineate different definitions of human uniqueness, showing 
how for him the distance of human from animal nature depends on the nobility 
assigned to certain organs over others.13 In the conclusion I claim that by reading the 
two dialogues together it is possible to uncover in La nobiltà an alternative outcome of 
the contest between the organs to the brain’s self-declared victory: taking account of 
another organ’s moment of triumph earlier in the text opens up a different scenario 
with regard to the proximity of humans to animals.14 
 
1. The Debate of the Organs in Context 
 
If Liceti is to be believed, he did not intend to publish either of his dialogues. He 
claims that La nobiltà was published because Andrea Ceva saw the text when he was 
visiting him, and that finding it amusing he asked to take a copy with him, which he 
then handed over to the publisher without Liceti’s permission or consent.15 Il Ceva, on 
the other hand, was apparently rescued ‘in extremis’ from a gruesome fate: being 
thrown in the fire, or fed to woodworms.16 This is, of course, a rhetorical topos; but it 
emphasizes nevertheless an important feature of Giuseppe Liceti’s dialogues: the 
crossroads of different disciplines and cultural worlds in which they stand is 
represented by the network of people that the dialogues address and that was 
instrumental to their reception. This network reaches into the milieu of the universities 
and of practical physicians. La nobiltà addresses an audience of students,17 and the 
text opens with a reference to the university lectures by the surgeon Gaspare 
Tagliacozzi (1545-1599) in Bologna; while Bartolomeo Della Torre, a physician from 
Genoa, features as Ceva’s interlocutor in Il Ceva.18 The world of the academies is also 
indirectly involved, as Andrea Ceva had lectured at the Accademia degli Svegliati in 
Pisa in 1588, only two years before the publication of La nobiltà.19  
In this context, Liceti’s explanation of his choice to write La nobiltà in Italian is 
noteworthy. Despite the fact that he had been advised that Latin was the more 
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appropriate language for this kind of philosophical discussion, in the address to the 
readers of Il Ceva, Liceti cites two reasons why, in fact, both dialogues had to be 
written in Italian:  
 
Nobody should be surprised that this treatise is published in our vernacular tongue, since I know very 
well ... it would have been better in Latin; yet I decided to let it be published this way because it is a 
defence of another dialogue of mine, on almost the same subject, also published in the vernacular; and, 
moreover, I was easily convinced to do so because it did not contain any indecent and less than honest 
terms.20   
 
The first reason is that the dialogues need to speak the same language in order for one 
to support the other. This, in turn, was necessary because the publication of the first 
dialogue had been met with criticism, as Liceti states that he was “almost obliged to 
defend [himself] from those who were wrongly tearing apart [his] writings”.21 Liceti 
does not mention the names of his critics. Yet it is clear that the accusations were 
directed at both the style and the content, for Liceti had included the testicles among 
the main bodily organs, and had given them a prominent place and an irreverent voice 
in the dialogue. It is not by chance that the second reason given by Liceti for the 
choice of the vernacular is expressed in terms of a defence: the dialogue La nobiltà 
“did not contain any indecent and less than honest terms”, alluding to the speeches of 
the testicles. The testicles, more than the other three organs, had highlighted the issue 
of the compatibility between content and style: evidently some early readers of La 
nobiltà questioned the appropriateness of discussing the nobility of the organs by 
giving the testicles not only a voice, but even an Italian one.22  
The testicles reflect on the legitimacy of their speaking in the vernacular at a point 
in the La nobiltà, when, directly challenging one of the main speakers in the dialogue, 
the heart, they promise a full display of the subtle arguments in their defence by 
stating: “Mr Heart, now listen up a little while and see if we are still able to argue”, or 
literally, “to know our Latin”.23 The expression “to know one’s Latin” refers primarily 
to the ability to argue properly. Yet the testicles, as well as all the other organs in the 
dialogue, know their Latin in a dual sense: they display good knowledge of a wide 
range of sources in Latin, which they discuss using sophisticated Italian terminology, 
transferring fundamental concepts from Latin into Italian; furthermore, by stressing 
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the fact that they speak Italian, they demonstrate that using the vernacular, rather than 
Latin, does not imply lessening the depth and rigour of philosophical argumentation.  
It is significant that the proudest Italian speaker of the dialogue turns out to be the 
testicles, arguing in favour of their own nobility, a word primarily understood in terms 
of the importance of the function performed by each. In Il Ceva, the character named 
Ceva points out that critics of La nobiltà had objected to the inclusion of the genitals 
amongst the main bodily organs, attacking Liceti for giving them a thinly disguised 
primacy over the others. Ceva’s interlocutor, Della Torre, replies that this critique was 
absurd, since Liceti had not been the first to include the organs of reproduction among 
the noblest ones.24 He had, in fact, drawn on a long-standing tradition. 
The literary model of the debate about the nobility of bodily organs has deep roots, 
as Fortunio Liceti points out in De mundi et hominis analogia. Here he underlines the 
connection between his father’s dialogue and its most famous antecedent: the speech 
by the Roman consul Menenius Agrippa, narrated by Livy, in which the state had been 
compared to the body, and the organs likened to the different parts of the republic.25 
Fortunio emphasizes that Agrippa himself had included the testicles in the metaphor, 
to represent the faculty of generation.26 Yet the aim of the two texts is completely 
different: Giuseppe Liceti’s dialogue is presented as a dream, but not as a metaphor, 
and rather than seeking to draw political conclusions, it stages the conflicts in the 
context of the medical and philosophical traditions. The metaphor of the body politic 
is employed only in the conclusion of Liceti’s dialogue, where the brain crowns itself 
as the winner by comparing its role to that of a king who forbids any further 
discussion. 
From a medical point of view, the selection of these four organs – the brain, heart, 
liver and organs of generation – as the noblest parts of the body has an important 
precedent in Avicenna. In his Canon, Avicenna had explained that, even if there are 
only three organs strictly necessary for the life of an individual (the brain, heart and 
liver) the organs of generation should be added to the list as well, since they are 
essential to the preservation of the entire species.27 According to the Greek model that 
became most influential in the Latin West, based primarily on Galenic medicine, the 
body had three main organs, corresponding to three powers of the soul located in the 
brain, heart and liver.28 Yet, the organs of generation are occasionally included as 
well:29 the idea that there are four main organs, and not three, resurfaces, for instance, 
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in a version of the popular pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum secretorum, paving the way 
for Liceti’s own interpretation.30   
In Renaissance medical literature, discussion of the nobility of the bodily organs or 
parts was embedded in the practical context of medical intervention. In Chirurgia 
nova, published in the same year as Il Ceva (1598), the Bolognese physician Gaspare 
Tagliacozzi had argued, with reference to Aristotle, that the face was without doubt the 
noblest part of the human body, both in terms of praestantia and of dignitas, since the 
face distinguishes humans from animals and in it the divinity of the human shines 
through most clearly.31 This view rested, of course, on a long physiognomic tradition, 
which owed much to the Secretum, and which Tagliacozzi reconfigured from a strictly 
medical viewpoint. It also shows the stratifications of meaning with regard to the 
nobility of the organs, as the conception of the physiological primacy of certain bodily 
organs over others is placed next to the identification of the main organs as a way to 
define human beings and their position in the world.  
Benedetto Varchi (1503-1565) had also notably approached the question of the 
nobility of the organs, but had more strongly intertwined medical and philosophical 
discourses, drawn especially from Galen and Aristotle. In a lecture on the generation 
of the human body, which starts from an interpretation of Canto 25 of Dante’s 
Purgatory and was delivered at the Accademia Fiorentina in 1543-4, Varchi had 
pointed out the conflict among philosophers and physicians over which organ is to be 
considered most important for the functioning of the human body.32 As Liceti was 
later to do, Varchi recognized the role of practice and observation, which often 
intervenes to correct overly abstract theories.33 Annalisa Andreoni has rightly pointed 
out that although Aristotle remains the crucial source and authority for Varchi, he does 
acknowledge that new medical and anatomical discoveries might lead to some 
adjustments. 34  The discussion of the role of the testicles in generation is of 
fundamental importance in the lecture; but they are not included among the main 
organs (the liver, heart and brain) 35  and there is no profound challenge to 
Aristotelianism, the principal philosophical position in the lecture. With regard to the 
function of the testicles in particular, Varchi reports that “according to Aristotle [they] 
are employed only as an instrument, and are, according to him, like two lead weights 
that keep the spermatic vessels open, that is to say the vessels of the semen.”36 
Of course, there are apparent stylistic differences between Varchi’s academic 
lecture and Liceti’s playful dialogue, as reflecting their different aims and 
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readerships.37 A shared feature, nevertheless, consists in the fact that in both cases 
abundant space is devoted to the discussion of the organs of generation, because it is in 
the understanding of the process of generation that the problematic interaction of 
medicine and philosophy is most evident. As Varchi clearly explains, what is at stake 
is ultimately the conception of the human soul itself, and especially the question of 
whether it is entirely transmitted with the sperm, or is at least in part infused later (as 
Varchi holds).38 Varchi’s lecture and Liceti’s dialogue were also both seen as being 
dangerously close to pornography, because of their discussions of generation.39 With 
regard to Liceti, the hostile reception of his dialogues suggests that some readers did 
grasp (but disagreed with) the crucial role of the testicles in the dialogue. They feature 
in the list of the noblest organs and they even overshadow the merits of the others, 
functioning as the catalyst of the conflict between philosophical and medical 
approaches. 
 
2. The Conflict of Philosophy and Medicine: Aristotle versus Galen versus Liceti 
 
In Il Ceva Aristotle is mentioned as the main point of reference for the controversy 
between the Dottori who received Liceti’s work favourably, and those who instead 
criticised it.40 The two interlocutors, Ceva and Della Torre, stage the contrast between 
the Aristotelians and Liceti himself by agreeing to a role-play: Ceva, who declares in 
the dialogue that he knows little philosophy and is completely ignorant of medicine, 
will play the part of the defendant of Aristotle, while Della Torre will defend Liceti 
and also side with Galen.41 Aristotelianism is thus opposed to the views of both a 
modern and an ancient physician.42  
The dialogue stages the challenge to certain Aristotelian conceptions from the 
perspective of Renaissance medicine. The underlying question is: can a Renaissance 
physician be an Aristotelian and, if so, how can he reconcile Aristotelian biology with 
medical practice? And furthermore, can there be a sensible dialogue between Galenic 
medicine and Aristotle’s biological approach or will they inevitably talk past each 
other? Liceti does not simply oppose medicine to philosophy, or Aristotle to the 
physicians. Rather, both in Il Ceva and in La nobiltà he uses the dialogue genre to 
reflect on the question of whether philosophical principles help or hinder the correct 
interpretation of medical and anatomical findings.43 Liceti sets up the contrast between 
Aristoteleanism and Galenism within the context of his critical exploration of the 
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advancement of medicine and its impact on the slower development of philosophical 
theories.44 His work testifies to Cees Leijenhorst’s apt description of the crisis of 
Aristotelianism as a phase of “overheating” rather than of “sterility”.45 
In La nobiltà each of the organs has recourse to a number of ancient and modern 
medical and philosophical sources. Yet specific positions ultimately crystallize. The 
heart is a “partisan of Aristotle”,46 and his main representative, since Aristotle in On 
the Generation of Animals drew a parallel between the heart and the sun, on the 
grounds that each of them produces the heat that is responsible for generation.47 The 
brain employs Galenic arguments about the study of the nerves to prove that it is 
actually the source of all movement, but it also tries to claim Plato for its side. The 
liver, too, has a particular connection to Plato, who considered this organ as the seat of 
the passions and of the appetitive faculty.48 The testicles, for their part, often point out 
that Aristotle is also on their side since he studied and rehabilitated the important 
function of animal generation; yet at the beginning of the dialogue the testicles are said 
by the narrator to be in the same camp as the liver and the brain in using Galen and 
Plato against the heart’s stubborn Aristotelianism.49 
The attempt of the organs to enlist and claim for themselves the main sources of the 
debate – Aristotle, Galen and Plato – often leads to ironic twists in their conversation. 
The heart accuses the liver of being unable not only to argue properly, but even to 
understand the real meaning of the sources it employs, especially Plato. It adds that 
Plato certainly recognized the nobility of the heart, while claiming that he did not 
regard the testicles as an important organ at all, since they are not mentioned in the 
relevant passage of the Timaeus regarding the functions of the organs.50 The testicles 
reply to the heart’s protest (“oh, do let me speak”) by rebuking it: “and you, leave us 
alone, keep your hands off our honour!”51 What is at stake in the dialogue is ultimately 
the assessment of which philosophical positions derived from Antiquity are still 
tenable in the light of recent developments in medicine.  
This assessment begins on a terminological level, as Liceti translates and adapts the 
Latin philosophical and medical terminology of his sources, consciously choosing a 
playful tone to lessen the theoretical density of the content. Liceti’s dialogues are 
populated not only by ancient philosophers and physicians, but also by contemporary 
doctors such as Vesalius, Realdo Colombo and Falloppio, who are all explicitly 
mentioned. La nobiltà begins with a reference to Tagliacozzi’s lectures on the brain,52 
which Liceti mocks by stating that his own brain, one of the main speakers in the 
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dialogue, was in fact such an ignoble and vain organ (“cervellaccio”) that it literally 
became inflated on hearing itself praised, pushing the melancholic humour out of the 
ears and becoming very joyful and excited.  
 Liceti’s organs are well-read Renaissance disputants, able to address terminological 
problems in their sources. One such problem is raised in a speech given by the liver, 
where the word “vena” is declared to be ambiguous, because it can mean both vein 
and artery: 
 
Do not go about boasting just because Plato said that you are the origin of the veins, because by veins 
Plato means in that instance those vessels that nowadays those who are more modern call, along with 
Galen, arteries, that is, those that pulsate, of which you are indeed the origin ... but I am the origin and 
source of those that do not pulsate and quietly bring the blood to all parts of the body.53  
 
Further facets are added through comments that specifically concern the translation of 
key terms from Aristotle’s Greek into Italian via Latin. A notable example is the long 
discussion about the origin of the nerves (“nervi”). In On the Parts of Animals 
Aristotle stated that the heart is the origin of movement, and that this explains why it 
has an abundance of sinews54 – in Greek neuron, which can also mean tendon or, 
indeed, nerve.55 The Renaissance fascination with the anatomical study of the brain led 
to a reassessment of the meaning to be attributed to Aristotle’s neura, voiced in La 
nobiltà by the brain, which challenges the heart to demonstrate by means of anatomy 
that it is the origin of the nerves.56 With this appeal to direct experience, the brain 
asserts that it is the source of sense and movement, against Aristotle, and in 
accordance with the anatomists and doctors, and with Galen: quite literally, Aristotle 
“does not know what he is talking about”,57 because he had not made the appropriate 
observations, and such confusion is reflected on the level of terminology, too, since 
the “nervi” of the dialogue are not Aristotle’s sinews of the heart.58  
The authority of Aristotle is at the centre of the debate between the heart and the 
liver in the first part of the dialogue. The heart states unequivocally that Aristotle’s 
doctrine is the truth; however, the liver voices a critique of the heart’s Aristotelianism 
by itself referring to Aristotle:  
 
According to the authority of your own Aristotle, the human being lives three types of life ... First he 
lives like plants, that is to say, for nourishment only; then he lives like an animal, adding sensation to 
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the vegetative faculty; and finally he lives as a human with the arrival in the body of the rational soul, 
which comes from outside, and not from matter, like the other two souls.59  
 
This is an accurate summary of book two, chapter three of On the Generation of 
Animals; but the liver expands on Aristotle by applying the psychological sequence in 
the development of a creature to the specific case of the formation of the organs, 
arguing that the liver comes first, as it embodies the life of plants in the body of an 
animal. But since the liver does not move, it is mistakenly neglected, and the heart is 
given an undeserved primacy. The movement of the heart is described by the liver as 
“opaque, and imperfect, and similar to that of the oysters, of mussels and of molluscs 
in their shells, and other similar natures that are between plants and animals, and that 
the Greeks calls zoophytes”. 60  The reply of the heart is telling: it stresses that 
Aristotle’s reasoning on the basis of foundational principles is incompatible with the 
liver’s claim that biological primacy means supremacy in terms of nobility. “Such 
explanations of yours are not explanations at all” – the heart continues – “but mere 
chimeras of clueless, brain-dead doctors and of lazy anatomists. I want Aristotle ... and 
not Galens!”61  
Yet, Liceti does not simply portray the liver as a paladin of anatomy, nor the heart 
as an old-fashioned supporter of Aristotle, uninterested in observation. Rather, he 
points to the embarrassment of the philosopher-physician, who is well aware of the 
conflict between some Aristotelian theories and of the need to address both the 
medical tradition and its latest developments. It is well known, for instance, that 
Aristotle faced the difficulty of explaining why the human heart is located in the left 
side of the chest: given his view that the position of each organ in the body is in 
accordance with its nobility, and that the centre is more noble than either the left or the 
side, it follows that if the heart is the most noble organ, it should enjoy a central 
position. 62  This theory is often mentioned in Liceti’s dialogue, where its 
inconsistencies appear: despite Aristotle’s interest in generation, for instance, the 
relationship of organs and their bodily positions seems to imply that the organs of 
generation are the least noble, since they occupy a lower position in the body. 
Similarly, it is puzzling why the brain should be regarded by Aristotle as an ancillary 
organ, the main function of which is that of cooling down the heat of the heart, since it 
occupies a central, upper position.63  
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 Liceti encourages his readers to appreciate conflicts of this kind between 
metaphysical principles – such as the criterion of nobility itself, or the belief that there 
can be only one primary organ only64 – and anatomical evidence. The liver complains 
that it should not be considered less worthy than the heart: this judgment derives from 
comparing the heart to the male and the liver to the female, and concluding that, 
according to the principle that the male is superior to the female, the heart is superior 
to the liver. But the liver points out that the superiority of the male over the female 
remains to be proven (Liceti might have in mind here works such as Heinrich 
Cornelius Agrippa’s De nobilitate et praeecellentia foeminei sexus, published in 
Italian for the first time around 1530 and then again in 1544).65  
 The superiority of males over females is discussed further in Il Ceva, developing an 
implication that in La nobiltà remains in the background: the presence of the testicles 
as speakers seems to eliminate women entirely from the debate. It is true that in the 
Renaissance both the male testicles and the female ovaries could be called testes, a 
terminological ambiguity that goes back to the Alexandrian physician Herophilus, who 
used the word didymoi (literally, “twins”) to define both.66 Yet, in Liceti’s narrative 
the genital organs debating their nobility are the author’s own (also, notably, the only 
‘double’ speaker in the dialogue). Moreover, the main theory at stake is Aristotle’s 
view that the testicles do not play an essential role in generation, functioning instead 
like “weights”, as was discussed by Varchi.67  
 The topic of the superiority of one gender over the other resurfaces in the context of 
a discussion of castration: the question debated is whether castration indirectly proves 
the crucial role of genitals as the noblest organ, since humans and animals which have 
undergone castration seem to change nature radically.68 “But what do you say about 
women?”, asks Ceva. Their nature, he states, cannot worsen as a result of castration.69 
The interlocutor answers that the question can only be intended as a joke, since Ceva 
prides himself on speaking respectfully of women. In any case, they agree that not 
many women are castrated, and the conversation moves to the castration of female 
animals, which is done either to fatten them for slaughter, or to stop reproduction.70 
The debate on castration shows in an exemplary way that the comparison between 
animals and humans plays a crucial role in this context, and it is no coincidence that 
Liceti refers to this topic several times in the text. Ultimately, the gap opening between 




3. The Seat of Rationality and Aristotle’s Anatomical Mistakes 
 
Another noteworthy example of such an untenable incongruity in Aristotle consists in 
statements about the size of the brain in On the Parts of Animals.71  Since these 
statements do not stand up to anatomical scrutiny, the question arises whether 
Aristotle neglected observation in favour of following the metaphysical principle that 
males are superior to females, and humans to animals. Countering Aristotle’s 
statement that among animals humans have the largest brain in relation to their size, 
and that human males possess a larger brain than females,72 the brain argues in La 
nobiltà that “it is false that I am bigger in a man than in a woman”, telling the heart: 
“you should look this up properly, not in Aristotle, who never saw me, but in Galen, in 
Vesalius, Realdo Colombo, and Falloppio, very skilled anatomists, and you’ll see how 
wrong you are.”73  
 The question of how to translate and adapt ancient philosophical and medical 
terminology in a vernacular discussion is even more prominent when the characters in 
the dialogue employ the word faculty, facoltà. The difficulty of pinning down what a 
faculty is, especially according to Aristotle and Galen, and how this concept relates to 
the anatomical study of the body, is reflected in the eclecticism of the speeches made 
by the various organs. In the exchange already mentioned about the origin of the veins, 
the heart fights against the primacy of the liver by reinterpreting the latter’s claim that 
its function is that of nourishing the whole body, like a trough (a “mangiatoia”). It 
might perform that function – the heart answers – but only because it “feeds” the lower 
parts, which the heart compares to wild beasts. Thus the heart calls the liver a feeding 
trough only suitable for animals.74 The heart uses the human-animal comparison to 
sketch a hierarchy of values between anatomical functions: as the source of blood, the 
heart declares itself to be “the seat of that faculty, which those veins work to spread 
through the whole body”.75 The liver’s answer to this provocation is to point out the 
irony that the fury of the heart’s argumentation only demonstrates that it is the seat of 
impulsive, rancorous feelings.76 
 Furthermore, the heart’s attempt to raise itself above the liver fails to take into 
account that if one returns to the conception of faculty, and especially to the idea of a 
hierarchy between more and less worthy faculties, then the primacy should be given to 
the brain, called by the liver the seat of the reasoning faculty.77 The brain refers to 
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itself as the “seat of the rational soul, principle of the animal faculty, origin of motion 
and feeling” and thus concludes that it is “beyond comparison much nobler”78 than the 
heart. Yet the juxtaposition of different terms and concepts betrays the legacy of a 
varied philosophical tradition, which cannot be precisely identified.  
 In this case the strategy of the brain seems to be that of confusing its opponents by 
citing all the generic tasks, skills, and faculties traditionally attributed to it, adding that 
it is also nobler because “memory, the cogitative faculty and imagination reside” in 
it.79 But while mentioning these faculties as further elements that contribute to its 
nobility, the brain also stresses that rationality alone plays the pivotal role in 
distinguishing human beings from all other forms of life, and from the animals in 
particular. Leaving aside the specific reference to the capabilities of remembering, and 
of cogitating (a term with a complex philosophical background), the brain resorts to a 
general view of Aristotelian origin: “The animal appears to live as an animal when it 
moves and feels, to live as an animated body through nutrition, and as a human being 
by reason.”80 Galen himself had stressed that only the exercise of the rational faculty 
allows humans to be different “from goats, and dogs, pigs, sheep, or donkeys”.81 The 
rational faculty, with its headquarters in the brain, regulates, restricts and even 
transcends the body: in other words, it is able to act on the body because it does not 
belong to the body. 
In his Lettione to the Accademia degli Svegliati, Andrea Ceva had discussed the 
role of reason as a main point of differentiation between humans and animals. A large 
section of the text is devoted to the question of human happiness, defined as a human 
being’s “proper and ultimate goal”,82 exploring whether this consists merely in bodily 
pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which humans shares with animals. In this 
context the human being is described as the only creature that sets itself a goal and 
then employs the appropriate means to achieve it, thanks to “reason, with which he is 
endowed and which the other animals lack completely (despite what some silly 
physicians say).”83 Given Ceva’s interest in the theories of physicians, such as Liceti, 
this sentence betrays the use of a rhetorical strategy to deflect attention from the real 
issue at stake: that if there are no “natural reasons”84 for arguing that humans and 
animals are different in their pursuit of happiness, then humans might actually be 
considered as living a life that is very similar to that of animals. Ceva expresses this 
doubt when he writes: “truly it appears that the human being is treated worse by nature 
in this respect than animals, which never fail in pursuing their goal, while the human 
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being can make thousands of mistakes, often choosing what is worse for itself out of 
ignorance or unwillingness.”85 Therefore, the human being’s highest goal, the pursuit 
of happiness, is adversely affected by a lack of efficiency and competence in striving 
towards it, while animals do not appear to fail in achieving their goals.  
From the initial methodological statement about the use of natural reasoning only, 
the text proceeds to introduce some doubt as to whether reason really constitutes the 
difference between humans and animals, and whether the pursuit of happiness in 
human life is anything more than the animals’ enjoyment of bodily pleasures. Ceva 
condemns this position, while voicing it clearly, and even listing the bodily 
satisfactions shared by humans and animals: “What voices, not of humans but of 
beasts, are these that are heard? So true happiness is to be found in corporeal 
happiness?” 86  This citation of the physicians’ opinion suggests a convergence of 
medicine and philosophy on a rather materialistic level, that is to say by emphasizing 
that the body is the foundation for the happiness of all creatures. 
In La nobiltà, Liceti uses a similar strategy to Ceva’s: although he presents the 
theory that rationality is the sign of human dignity, he nevertheless uses the dialogue 
format to subvert this simple way to maintain human superiority. At the conclusion of 
the dialogue, the brain, the seat of rationality, triumphs over all other organs, and 
especially the testicles, the seat of the more basic and base function of generation. As 
the seat of the rational faculty, the brain should be the most skilled of all the organs in 
arguing in favour of its own nobility. Instead, however, it uses fables and allegories, 
“employed as arguments by the knowledgeable”.87 The main source mentioned in the 
conclusion of the dialogue is Plato’s Timaeus. Rather than anatomy, it is Platonic 
philosophy that is employed to explain why the head is round: the gods shaped it that 
way so that it would resemble the world, and the divine gifts of the soul, intellect and 
will, were placed in it.88 In vain the heart protests that Galen made numerous mistakes 
precisely because he followed Plato rather than Aristotle.89 Sidestepping any further 
explanation, the brain compares the body to a republic with fixed laws regulating it: 
the soul is said to operate in the whole body through the plurality of its instruments, 
while the brain is the worthy seat of the rational power that defines the human being as 
such.90 Liceti, like Ceva, thus implicitly questions the legitimacy of this view of the 




4. Conclusion: Two Winners? 
 
To contemporary readers, the victory of the brain at the end of La nobiltà must have 
appeared not entirely settled, above all because Liceti had given an unusually strong 
voice to the testicles.91 At the beginning of Il Ceva, Ceva and Della Torre reconsider 
the meaning of nobility and whether the organ to be elected as the noblest is the one, 
which is the origin of essential parts of the body. Ceva challenges the view that the 
brain is the noblest because it is the origin of nerves and veins. Such a prerogative 
should rather be attributed to the heart and the liver.92 Yet as the discussion develops, 
it is the genitals, which are revealed as the most original, that is to say fundamental, 
organ, because in the semen is encapsulated the whole man.93 Therefore, if nobility 
means being the origin, the testicles are still a possible candidate to win the contest. 
Moreover, while the brain’s self-declared victory is the real conclusion of La 
nobiltà, it is a comment by the testicles, earlier in the dialogue, that sets the tone for 
the entire development of the discussion, and continues to resonate as a sort of 
admonition even in the conclusion, where the testicles are declared to be the least 
noble of all organs. The comment follows from a discussion of the “nervi reversivi”, 
which an experiment on a dog, reminiscent of Galen’s own practice of vivisection, 
showed to be involved in the act of speaking. The testicles apply this anatomical 
investigation to the main issue of the partisanship of the organs in the dialogue:  
 
Those who speak against the truth, that is, against what is proven by experience and reason together, 
and who don’t care about lying as long as they speak in favour of Aristotle, or of another writer they 
have chosen to defend, deserve to have those two nerves cut through without any mercy, so that in 
future they won’t spread errors in the minds of those who are still ignorant.94  
 
Whether Aristotle, or Galen, or Plato is selected as the privileged source of 
knowledge, the real problem is how to manage the plurality and the diversity of 
sources, and whether it is justifiable to follow only one of them. Through the 
discussion of the nobility of the organs, Liceti addresses questions of authority, 
distancing himself from any one particular school, and appealing to the need to 
compare and revise by means of experience and reason. It is the testicles, not the brain, 
which voice this crucial issue in the dialogue. 
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La nobiltà puts Galen and Aristotle on trial, considering how well their theories of 
the interaction of body and soul withstand the inquiring approach of philosopher-
physicians like Liceti himself. This is a complex operation of critical transmission, 
enabled by the dialogue format. Liceti’s Italian dialogues are reflections on the legacy 
of ancient philosophy, and on the eclectic beginnings of new Renaissance 
developments, at the crossroads of anatomy, medicine and metaphysics. Liceti shows 
that negotiating the legacy and authority of Aristotle is the key to understanding how a 
Renaissance physician should engage with philosophical principles, and conversely 
how an Aristotelian philosopher should approach the study of medicine, a subject on 
which Aristotle famously remained silent (if one excludes the medical advice in the 
pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum and in the Problemata). Liceti’s strategy in dealing with 
this varied legacy consists in transferring the debate to the interior of the body itself. 
The different perspectives of the organs display the intertwining and contrasting of the 
sources, while permitting the author of the dialogue an ironic, sceptical detachment.  
This strategy is embodied at its best in the most embarrassing organ in the dialogue, 
the testicles, which quote from different sources but conform to none of them, and 
which are endowed with the most explicitly ironic voice in La nobiltà. To the main 
criticism that they are not essential for a creature’s survival, they reply that the heart 
can rightly be considered the source of life, but that they make it possible not just to 
live, but to live well, going against both Aristotle and Galen.95 The heart, speaking in 
Aristotelian terms, argues not only that the testicles are unnecessary for generation, but 
that the animals which have them are those least inclined to generate, and most prone 
to chastity. The answer of the testicles goes proudly in the opposite direction: they 
claim that they augment lust, rather than diminish it.96 The testicles appear to view the 
pleasure animals derive from the use of their genitals as an essential part of animal 
life, and a heightened level of  “lust” (lussuria) as a bonus rather than a malus.  
In On the Length and Shortness of Life Aristotle had maintained that lustful animals 
tend to have short lives because of the weakening effect of sexual intercourse. Liceti’s 
testicles take an anti-Aristotelian stance in this case, since they do not warn against the 
dangers of lust but instead praise it.97 The problem raised by Aristotle was well known 
and debated throughout the Middle Ages, and is clearly formulated in a very 
successful collection first printed in Latin in 1491 and in Italian in 1495: the 
Fasciculus medicinae. In a section dedicated to gynaecology and reproduction, the 
theory about the dangers of lust is discussed with reference to Aristotle. Lust, it is 
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claimed, consumes the brain by causing a dissipation of humidity. 98  Against this 
tradition, the testicles in Liceti’s dialogue embody the need for careful anatomical 
investigation, using later anatomists to correct Aristotle, whose views show that he did 
not know the proper function of the testicles (nor that of the ovaries in women). The 
testicles are the trait d’union between the interpretation of the nobility of the organs as 
based on the sheer efficiency of the bodily functions, and a more comprehensive view 
of animals’ lives, and of human life in particular, including the striving for pleasure, 
and happiness, beyond the strictly biological need for reproduction.  
In both dialogues, Liceti’s rhetorical strategy involves intertwining several voices, 
representing more than just one position on the matter of nobility. Therefore it can be 
said that ultimately he delivers not one winner (the brain or the testicles), but two 
completely different conceptions of the human being. If the brain is considered to be 
the winner, as it explicitly is, then rationality marks the difference between humans 
and animals, setting up a clear hierarchy, also represented in the fact that the brain 
crowns himself king of the body. If the testicles are instead viewed as the ‘real’ winner 
of the debate, as Liceti’s contemporary critics seem to have suspected, then humans 
are instead grouped with those animals that, like them, possess external genitals. In the 
first scenario, the conflict of medicine and philosophy is resolved by considering the 
brain’s nobility as both an anatomical and a philosophical concept. In the second 
scenario, it is the human being’s continuity with the world of animals that is 
emphasized. 
A central feature of Liceti’s rhetoric lies in his use of the Italian language. 
Therefore, it is important to note that, of the characters of the dialogue, it is the 
testicles that are the most proud to speak Italian,99 as the choice of letting them express 
themselves in the vernacular is directly defended in Il Ceva. The Italian language they 
use is filled with exclamations and colourful expressions, criticising in particular those 
who do not refrain from telling lies, and who reject truth (that is to say, experience) as 
long as they follow an authority. 100  This goes hand in hand with the testicles’ 
argument, which sets both human and animal lust in a positive light. Ultimately, it is 
their irreverent voice that turns La nobiltà into a sharp reflection on the legitimacy not 
only of questioning the authority of Aristotle in the light of medical practice, but also 
of doing this in Italian, without fear of resorting to “less than honest terms”, and even 
while holding, metaphorically, the surgeon’s knife, threatening to cut the vocal cords 
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